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Book Note
WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN
PATERNALISM, by Cass R. Sunstein1
DAN ADLER
WHAT IS THE LEGITIMATE SCOPE of government intervention into individual

decision-making? In Why Nudge? The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism, Sunstein
defends the novel claim that governments ought to influence—or nudge—
individuals into making choices that help them best achieve their desired goals.
This book serves as a companion to the earlier text he co-wrote with Richard H.
Thaler which outlines how failures in human reasoning contribute to suboptimal
decision-making in the context of healthcare, financial planning, and other
public policy issues.2
This book is divided into six main parts. The Introduction outlines one
very influential principle for determining the legitimate scope of government
intervention. This is John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, which states simply that
“[u]nless there is harm to others, the government cannot exercise power over
people.”3 In defense of this principle, Sunstein points out the intuitive appeal of
the epistemic argument: Each individual best knows his or her preferences, and
so can best identify his or her ends and the best means of obtaining them.4
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4.

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014) 208 pages.
Richard H Thaler & Cass R Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and
Happiness, revised ed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
Supra note 1 at 4.
Ibid at 7.
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Chapter one presents an empirical challenge to the epistemic argument.
Drawing on Daniel Kahneman’s research5 and the findings in Nudge6, Sunstein
outlines the range of errors in human decision-making, including caring more
about events or outcomes that will occur sooner rather than later7; ignoring
features of a product or activity that are not salient8; making unrealistically
optimistic predictions about one’s own behaviour and future prospects9; and
making predictions about probabilities based on the ease with which a related
event or example comes to mind.10 These errors prevent individuals from
obtaining their chosen ends—resulting in what Sunstein refers to as “behavioural
market failures.”11
Given that Mill’s harm principle does not account for these phenomena,12
Sunstein argues that government intervention can correct behavioural market
failures. Chapter two defends a type of government intervention called libertarian
paternalism. It is a form of soft paternalism (in contrast to hard), which attempts
to influence individual choices without imposing material costs.13 It is also a
form of means paternalism (in contrast to ends), which attempts to influence only
those actions individuals take to achieve their chosen aims.14 By combining these
features, libertarian paternalism holds that governments should design public
policy in such a way that guides individual decision-making to avoid the errors
in reasoning that prevent people from attaining their chosen ends.
Chapter three defends one moral argument in favour of libertarian
paternalism: It can improve people’s lives.15 Sunstein persuasively shows that
objections to this claim are refuted empirically by the frequency of behavioural
market failures.16 Chapter four defends a second moral argument in defense
of libertarian paternalism: It preserves and enhances individual autonomy and
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For a comprehensive overview of his findings, see Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow
(New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2011). See also Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The
Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions, revised ed (New York: HarperCollins Publishers,
2010).
Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 2.
Supra note 1 at 35.
Ibid at 40.
Ibid at 45.
Ibid at 48.
Ibid at 16.
Ibid at 81-82.
Ibid at 58.
Ibid at 68-69.
Ibid at 87.
Ibid at 108.
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freedom of choice.17 It does so because of the inevitability of choice architecture.
This refers to the context in which individual decision-making takes place,18
which is characterized by the ordering or physical arrangement of different
choices, and the presence of default choices. Choice architecture can be designed
in a way that helps people pursue the ends they choose.19
Finally, chapter five considers some of the practical challenges posed by the
implementation of paternalistic governmental policies. First, governments must
be transparent about when and how they are designing paternalistic policies.20
Second, there must be mechanisms to prevent abuses of power, which includes
a requirement that it be easy for individuals to act against whatever paternalistic
policies aim to achieve.21 Finally, the application of paternalistic policies
should not interfere too stringently with individuals’ pursuit of pleasurable or
meaningful, albeit risky, activities.22 Though these are important considerations,
Sunstein successfully shows that they do not seriously undermine the potential
benefits of libertarian paternalism.
Sunstein masterfully weaves together emerging research in behavioural
economics with some of the most fundamental issues in moral philosophy.
He colours his study with vivid examples of real world problems, producing a
book that is highly readable and oftentimes quite funny. Still, its arguments are
forceful and persuasive, leaving the reader with no doubt of the importance of the
issues—for policymakers, lawmakers, and indeed for the public at large.
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